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DID THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE WORK? 
Simon M. Meisenberg* 
In his 2007 Alec Roche Annual Lecture in Public International Law at 
the University of Oxford, former President of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Judge Theodor Meron, asked: 
“Does international criminal justice work?” For such an assessment, Judge 
Meron suggested four criteria: i) finding and trying alleged perpetrators; ii) 
providing a fair trial; iii) deterring international crimes; and iv) promoting 
peace and healing.1  
How would such an assessment for the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(SCSL) look like? Did the Special Court for Sierra Leone work? Moreover, 
does Professor Jalloh’s comprehensive assessment in his book The Legal 
Legacy of the Special Court for Sierra Leone provide an honest and 
straightforward answer to this question? Obviously, Professor Jalloh worked 
in the trenches of the SCSL in Freetown and The Hague. Therefore, and as 
equally noted by Judge Meron at the outset of his assessment of the ad hoc 
tribunals, Professor Jalloh’s assessment may naturally tend to answer the 
question with a resounding “Yes” or “Yes, but . . . ,” as any negative response 
would inevitably tarnish his own professional heritage. The detail and rigor 
of Professor Jalloh’s assessment, his critical but polite and witty observations 
prove that his appraisal is genuine and made in the best academic fashion. He 
puts the finger on the sore spots of the jurisprudential legacy of the SCSL, in 
particular where the reasoning of the decisions and judgments are weak or at 
times questionable. The book is without any doubt an objective and critical 
assessment of the Court’s work.  
Having said this, how did the SCSL perform according to Judge 
Meron’s four-pronged criteria and to the assessment of Professor Jalloh? It is 
of note that Professor Jalloh’s study of the SCSL focuses on the 
jurisprudential legacy, but it nevertheless provides sufficient detail to assess 
the Court’s work according to Judge Meron’s test.  
 
* Simon M. Meisenberg (LLM) is Chef de Cabinet/Senior Legal Officer at the Kosovo Specialist 
Chambers (The Hague). He has been working as Senior Legal Officer at the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
in Freetown and The Hague.  
1 THEODOR MERON, Does International Criminal Justice Work?, in THE MAKING OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A VIEW FROM THE BENCH: SELECTED SPEECHES 139 (2011).  
9 - MEISENBERG (DO NOT DELETE) 7/11/2021  12:17 PM 
50 FIU Law Review [Vol. 15:49 
   
 
Finding and trying alleged perpetrators and providing fair trials: Only 
six months after the conclusion of the agreement between the UN and the 
Government of Sierra Leone on January 16, 2002, the Court began 
establishing its offices and operating with an advance team by July 2002. 
Judges were sworn in on July 25, 2002, and a first Plenary was held in early 
March 2003. Thereafter, the Prosecutor quickly filed charges against thirteen 
individuals whom it believed to bear the greatest responsibility for the 
atrocities committed during the armed conflict in Sierra Leone between 1996 
and 2001. Almost all individuals were arrested within months. The arrest and 
trial of Taylor, the only non-Sierra Leone national who had to be arrested 
outside Sierra Leonean territory, was a more complex affair and stalled the 
overall impressive record of apprehending the perpetrators. Three joined 
trials were conducted within an average of three years, and the individual trial 
of Taylor took four years. All accused were guaranteed the minimum fair trial 
rights in accordance with international human rights law and made use of 
their right to challenge questions of fact and law before an appeals bench. 
The appeals process on average took about seven months for the AFRC, RUF 
and CDF Trials.2 The Taylor appeal took considerably longer. Overall, nine 
persons were convicted and sentenced, one person died during trial, one died 
shortly after his arrest, and one before his arrest. Only one person is formally 
still at large but believed to be deceased. Approximately a decade after its 
establishment, the SCSL concluded its mandate in 2013.  
This is undeniably an impressive record, despite the constant criticism 
at the time about the languor of the trials.3 The critical question under Judge 
Meron’s first two criteria is, however, whether all perpetrators were found 
and tried fairly. The SCSL mandate focused on those “who bear the greatest 
responsibility . . . including those leaders who, in committing such crimes, 
have threatened the establishment of and implementation of the peace process 
in Sierra Leone.”4 Professor Jalloh concludes that this formulation was 
chosen to limit the jurisdiction of the Court and to ensure an efficient and 
 
2 Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Appeals Judgment (Feb. 22, 2008); Prosecutor 
v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Judgment (March 2, 2009); Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. 
SCSL-04-14-A, Appeals Judgment (May 28, 2008). 
3 See ANTONIO CASSESE, REPORT ON THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 1 ¶ 3 (Dec. 12, 
2006), http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Cassese%20Report.pdf (“This institutional experiment was 
indisputably innovative and broke new ground in international criminal justice. However, although 
meritorious in many respects, the new judicial body has not fully lived up to its initial expectations from 
the viewpoint of expeditiousness.”).  
4 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 1, ¶ 1, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 145. 
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cost-effective tribunal that would only prosecute a handful of perpetrators.5 
Despite the legal challenges identified by Professor Jalloh with the concept 
of only prosecuting those who bear the greatest responsibility, it has to be 
stated that this model of narrowing the mandate of an international court 
ensures that international criminal justice works in an effective manner. 
International criminal justice can never entirely substitute a domestic judicial 
system and prosecute all perpetrators of atrocity crimes. It can only 
complement domestic prosecutions and other transitional justice 
mechanisms, such as a truth and reconciliation commission. In addition, 
focusing on the leading warmongers effectively and eventually silences their 
willing executioners. Uprooting and prosecuting all the leaders of the warring 
factions of the Sierra Leone conflict was undoubtedly one of the key elements 
that ensured a successful peace process in the war-torn country. All previous 
attempts and measures, for example providing blanket amnesties to 
perpetrators, were in vain and not successful. To be sure, this is not to say 
that the SCSL is alone responsible for ensuring a successful transition to 
peace, but it was an effective ingredient. The unease identified by Professor 
Jalloh with respect to the concept of “those who bear the greatest 
responsibility,” as it lacks legal specificity, should therefore not overshadow 
a key tool that increases the potential of international criminal tribunals and 
which keeps the expectations towards such courts within realistic boundaries.  
Deterring international crimes and promoting peace and healing: The 
consequence of limiting the prosecution of individuals before an international 
criminal tribunal brings us to the third and fourth criteria. The gap created by 
the absence of any credible domestic prosecution may alter a deterrent effect 
created by international tribunals and may hinder peace and reconciliation. 
The unfortunate absence of domestic prosecutions in Sierra Leone is the 
consequence of the Lomé amnesty agreement. The SCSL Appeals Chamber 
held that such a blanket amnesty did not shield the prosecution from 
international crimes, which may be prosecuted in accordance with the 
principle of universality before an international tribunal. It did not pronounce 
the effect of the amnesty for domestic crimes and prosecutions. In the specific 
circumstances of Sierra Leone, and, given the violation of the amnesty deal 
by the rebel factions, there are strong arguments to simply declare such a 
Faustian bargain null and void, thereby providing domestic prosecutors with 
a door opener to prosecute mid-level and low-level perpetrators.6 The SCSL 
 
5 CHARLES C. JALLOH, THE LEGAL LEGACY OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 146 
(2020).  
6 See Antonio Cassese, The Special Court and International Law: The Decision Concerning the 
Lomé Agreement Amnesty, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1130–40 (2004).  
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Appeals Chamber did not choose this path. This was an unusual restrictive 
decision for an Appeals Chamber that otherwise did not shy away from 
judicial ingenuity.7 On the other hand, this provided the TRC with the 
necessary room to promote reconciliation within the war-torn Sierra Leonean 
society. The fact that the Prosecutor even-handedly charged individuals of all 
the warring factions equally contributed to the peace process and the healing 
of the society. The SCSL was not established during an armed conflict but 
only when it had ended. It was, therefore, not able to deter any crimes in that 
specific context. But as Professor Jalloh points out in his discussion on the 
relationship between the TRC and the SCSL, the creation of the Court was a 
repudiation of the Lomé amnesty and a shift from the emphasis of 
reconciliation towards punishment and deterrence.8 Too long was there the 
belief among the rebel leadership of getting away with impunity despite the 
commission of the most heinous crimes. Moreover, through the 
establishment and the ground-breaking jurisprudence on the non-
applicability of amnesties and immunities of Head of States for international 
crimes before international criminal tribunals, a clear deterrent message has 
been sent that such heinous crimes will not go unpunished and that the rule 
of law prevails over the rule of force. This general observation was also 
shared by the Head of the Sierra Leonean delegation at the Kampala Review 
Conference to the Rome Statute stating: 
[I]n Sierra Leone, the Special Court has not only made 
tremendous contributions to accountability through its legal 
and judicial achievements; it has also developed our national 
capacity, particularly for our law enforcement and legal 
professionals, to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute 
those alleged to have committed crimes under international 
law; and it has contributed to restoring confidence in the 
institutions of State and the rule of law. Capacity building is of 
critical importance for the principle of complementarity: at the 
time the Special Court was established, Sierra Leone was 
willing but unable to address those crimes. We were fortunate 
to have the support of the international community in 
establishing the Court to assist us to ensure that impunity 
would not stand.9 
 
7 See JALLOH, supra note 5, at 150–276. 
8 Id. at 311. 
9 Vandi Chidi Minah, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the 
Republic of Sierra Leone, Statement by the Head of Delegation, to the Review Conference of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (June 2010).  
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Professor Jalloh points to critical aspects of the SCSL jurisprudence. 
Indeed, not everything was faultless, and his detailed assessment provides 
proof of some unpersuasive aspects of some of the decisions. Such critical 
analysis is important in the discussion of the jurisprudential legacy of the 
SCSL. Nevertheless, from a holistic point of view and with some of the 
weaknesses identified by Professor Jalloh, an overall assessment of Judge 
Meron’s criteria would result in an overall positive reflection of the SCSL 
legacy and that this model of international criminal justice did indeed work. 
 
